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Abstract 
This article discusses how China's institutional constraints combine with its integration into the 
global economy to suppress its workers' rights. The rapid expansion of China's market economy 
is the consequence of the government's active embrace of global capitalism and global 
capitalists' ongoing search for new markets and lower production costs. China's traditional 
socialist labor relationships collapsed as a result of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform and the 
emergence of private enterprises. In the wake of these events, China's leaders promulgated new 
labor legislation and social insurance schemes, but these initiatives fail to safeguard workers' 
rights effectively. This is because the SOEs fail to compensate their workers properly, local 
authorities do not actively monitor labor abuses, the judicial system cannot effectively defend 
workers' rights, and the Chinese government suppresses efforts to organize independent labor 
unions. In short, global capitalism together with China's authoritarian polity have limited 
workers' rights and undermined their well-being. 
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China's adoption of free-market policies and the subsequent influx of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) have accelerated the nation's economic globalization. Between 1984 and 2008, FDI in 
China increased from US$1.3 billion to US$92.4 billion (Chinability n.d.). The story of 
globalization has come full circle since China's integration into the world economy (Lechner 
2009, 83). This integration increased the wealth of Chinese people rapidly; the nation's per capita 
gross domestic product jumped from ¥251 in 1980 to ¥7,518 in 2010 (IndexMundi 2010). 
The literature proposes several different arguments concerning globalization's effect. 
Some studies focus on between-country interactions. Others advance a race-to-the-bottom thesis, 
which holds that nation-states have to maintain their economic competitiveness by restricting 
labor's benefits. Still others insist that this second position is too deterministic and assert that 
countries' domestic institutions play important roles in mediating the forces of global capitalism. 
With this last view in mind, the current article examines how China's domestic institutions shape 
the rights of Chinese workers in the age of globalization. 
Economic Globalization and Domestic Institutions 
Globalization is a challenging term to define, as its definition differs with the perspectives of 
those defining it. Two of these perspectives take in global capitalism's complex relationships 
with nation-states. The first focuses on various levels of between-country interaction that resulted 
from the collapse of state communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the advance of 
communication technologies, and the increasingly complicated economic and environmental 
issues now affecting many countries. In this perspective, globalization is defined as the dynamic 
social, political, cultural, and economic interactions between nations. For example, David Held 
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and Anthony McGrew (2000, 4) assert that globalization "denotes the expanding scale, growing 
magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social 
interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human social organization that 
links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world's major 
regions and continents." 
The other major perspective on globalization focuses mainly on the expansion of global 
capitalism and its impact on labor and social services. This perspective defines globalization as 
"an economic process, increasing cross-border integration of production and markets" 
(Callinicos 2007, 64). This process involves the "freedom for capital to move across national 
boundaries" (Mehmet, Mendes, and Sinding 1999, 17). The perspective envisions a search by 
capitalists, particularly the owners of multinational corporations in advanced economies, for new 
consumer markets and for new factory locations that will reduce production costs. 
This second perspective, reflected in the race-to-the-bottom thesis, suggests that 
globalization reduces nation-states' power over their welfare policies by leaving governments 
with little choice but to give multinational companies labor and welfare concessions in exchange 
for investment. At a time when capital is markedly transnationally mobile (Milberg 2004), the 
theory holds that governments trying to attract FDI must create favorable business environments 
by limiting business regulations, taxes, environmental protection, wages, and labor welfare 
(Mehmet et al. 1999; Braunstein and Epstein 2004). Layna Mosley (2007, 116-17) summarizes 
this perspective's key features by noting that "the global economy has placed governments, 
particularly in the developing world, in a 'golden straightjacket'; they must compete in order to 
survive, and the only means of competing is reducing government intervention, lowering taxes, 
and steadfastly pruning environmental, health and safety, and labor regulations." 
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This means that "global markets become masters of governments, eviscerating the 
authority of national states" (Mosley 2007, 111). As noted earlier, however, some critics argue 
that this thesis as too deterministic; they find that domestic institutions can mediate the forces of 
the global economy (Gough 2000; Regini 2000; Gilpin 2001; Braunstein and Epstein 2004; 
Weiss 2004). 
After studying small, trade-dependent European states, Peter Katzenstein concludes that 
"historical differences in these states' domestic institutions generate cross-national variation in 
political-economic strategies" (cited in Mosley 2007, 111; see also Katzenstein 1985). Elissa 
Braunstein and Gerald Epstein (2004, 211) find further that FDI's effect depends on countries' 
institutional contexts, and that states in some institutional circumstances can "exert bargaining 
power over MNCs' [multinational corporations'], and regulate them such a way as to generate 
significant benefits for their communities." 
In examining such contexts, Ian Gough (2000) finds differences in responses by several 
East Asian states to the 1997 Asian economic crisis. He notes that Korea moved toward 
becoming a developed welfare state, but Thailand and Indonesia adopted a so-called third way 
based on community and local innovations; Malaysia and the Philippines exhibited less policy 
innovation than their neighbors. He concludes that "domestic and international institutions, 
interests and ideas" mediate the forces of globalization (2001, 4). 
Some suggest that the nature of a nation's polity determines its resistance to external 
economic pressures. Advanced democratic governments manage to maintain their high 
expenditures on social services (Deacon 2000; Garrett 2000; Scharpf 2000; Weiss 2003). 
Social-democratic, citizenship-based, Western European welfare states, in particular, are 
"surprisingly sustainable in the face of global competitive pressures" (Deacon 2000, vii). 
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Furthermore, Linda Weiss (2003, 295) points out that developed welfare states' total public 
social welfare expenditure as a percentage of national income has not declined in the 1990s 
despite benefit cuts and increases in restrictions on welfare entitlements. She concludes that the 
developed democracies' fiscal behavior "has not been consistent with the idea of an eroding tax 
base undermining welfare policy" (2003, 295) and takes this to mean that the states have avoided 
an all-out race to the bottom. 
Geoffrey Garrett (2000, 396) argues that countries in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) do not respond to globalization by promoting a policy of 
racing to the neoliberal bottom, as they already have embedded and extensive social 
infrastructures. He notes that these features make it likely that governments will encounter strong 
resistance if they attempt retrenchment from their public welfare responsibilities. Fritz Scharpf 
(2000, 371) finds that democratic states need to regulate labor markets and production processes 
for the benefit of workers, as the states derive their legitimacy from "a commitment to the public 
interest and to distributive justice." That is, drastic welfare cuts would likely pose a direct threat 
to the legitimacy of most democratic governments. 
Undemocratic governments, by contrast, are able to suppress labor rights and limit 
welfare expenditures. Ozay Mehmet and colleagues (1999) point out that the common feature of 
the miraculous East Asian economies is their administration by notably authoritarian 
governments. Governments in those states are hostile to workers' rights to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining. They add that "failure to respect workers' rights on the part of host 
governments while developing cozy business relations with MNCs [multinatonal corporations] 
creates an institutionalized imbalance in power between labour and capital: the welfare of 
workers, especially the vulnerable ones, is declining in an otherwise integrating world economy" 
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(1999, 17). 
Al l this suggests that domestic institutions tend to shape globalization's pressure on social 
policies, as authoritarian polities are less likely than democratic ones to resist international 
capitalists' demands. Specific cross-national differences in domestic institutions also are found to 
vary the effect of external economic forces on East Asian countries (Mosley 2007). This article 
therefore examines how China's domestic institutions shape the effect of economic globalization 
on workers' rights. 
Globalization and China's Labor Policies 
This section examines how the Chinese government reorganized its social protection system and 
rebuilt labor relations through new labor legislation to address the challenges caused by the 
nation's economic globalization. Since its open-door policy began in the late 1970s, China has 
successfully attracted a large amount of foreign capital. More than 380,000 foreign enterprises 
were established there between 1980 and 2001 (Zhu 2004). The nation became the world's 
second largest recipient of FDI in 2009 (the United States was the \argest)(Bloomberg News, 
2010). 
Economic globalization in China is the consequence of an active policy to engage with 
global capitalism and of global capitalists' search for new investment opportunities. In the 1980s, 
the Chinese government set up special economic zones in Guangdong Province, Fujian Province, 
and coastal cities in other provinces. The zones were designed to attract foreign capital. Foreign 
investors in these zones received special advantages, including concessionary tax policies and 
exemptions from export and import duties for equipment and instruments. The goal of China's 
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economic policy is to lure export-oriented FDI (Braunstein and Epstein 2004; Lechner 2009). 
In 1986, the Chinese government began an active campaign to gain membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). It did so on the premise that WTO membership could 
"accelerate the flow of foreign investment into China ... [as] the engine of growth" (Braunstein 
and Epstein 2004, 237). China estimated that WTO membership would increase its GDP by 22 
percent, and such an increase implied the creation of more than 11.8 million new jobs (Chang 
2002). In 2001, China was accepted as a member of the WTO after years of negotiations. 
To accelerate growth and meet WTO membership criteria, China had to change the 
structure of many of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs)1. Claustre Bajona and Tianshu Chu 
(2010, 802) note that the WTO's 1995 Annex B of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures targeted China's SOEs. It stipulates that subsidies in the form of grants 
and tax breaks for SOEs which were running at a loss needed to be phased out within 5 years 
(Word Trade Organisation 2001). Also, China and the United States signed the Agreement on 
Market Access between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America in 1999. 
Accordinlgy, China needs to reduce tariffs, eliminate import quotas, open its banking, insurance, 
and securities markets, and open its accounting, consulting, engineering, medical, and 
information-technology service industries (Braunstein and Epstein 2004). In particular, the 
agreement requires China to lower its average tariffs from over 40 percent to 11 percent (Wu 
2009). In short, Chinese companies likey face fiercer foreign competition because China, being a 
WTO member, is required to give "full access to its market to foreign firms" (Braunstein and 
Epstein 2004, 239). China's reform of SOEs therefore became a process of eliminating 
inefficient enterprises and enhancing the productivity of selected ones so that they could survive 
external competition for the domestic market. 
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In order to facilitate SOE reform, Chinese leaders published a key document, Decision on 
Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure , at the third 
plenum of the Fourteenth Communist Party Congress (Chinese Communist Party [CCP] Central 
Committee 1993). In this decision, the government protected some key SOEs that it continually 
supervises for strategic considerations but sold or bankrupted many small and medium-sized 
SOEs. It transformed others into different types of businesses. In 1994, the implemenation of the 
Company Law of the People's Republic of China provides a legal base for this enterprise reform 
(National People's Congress 1993). In a 1999 publication, Decisions on the Reform and 
Development of SOEs, the government announced an effort to build a modern enterprise system 
for its SOEs within 3 years (CCP Central Committee 1999). 
The SOE reforms forced millions of workers to retire early and made many middle-aged 
workers redundant; layoffs touched 5.6 million workers in 1995, 8.9 million in 1996, and 11.5 
million in 1997 (Lee 2000). Approximately 28 million workers lost their jobs from 1998 to 2003 
(Information Office of the State Council 2004). Some suggest that the actual number of laid-off 
workers is higher, because many workers and enterprises did not go though a "cumbersome" 
process of obtaining the certificate that identifies a worker as laid-off (Lee 2000, 924). 
The government introduced several initiatives to meet the demands that arose for welfare 
assistance as a result of the SOE reforms and the emergence of private enterprises. It initially set 
up Re-employment Service Centers, where laid-off workers could receive job training and 
financial assistance for a maximum of 3 years before the termination of their formal employment 
relationship with an SOE. These centers also paid laid-off workers' social insurance premiums 
for pensions, unemployment, and health. In order to meet the welfare needs of all types of 
workers and poor citizens, the government eventually established three security systems: a 
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basic-living guarantee system for SOEs' laid-off workers, an unemployment insurance system for 
all unemployed workers, and a minimum-living-standard guarantee for poor people. It intended 
these systems to function as a means of addressing widespread poverty in the mixed economy 
(China Internet Information Center 2002). 
Moreover, the Chinese government called on employers and employees to share the 
welfare burden by implementing various types of insurance schemes following the collapse of its 
traditional enterprise-based welfare system. In 1997, it issued the Decision of the State Council 
on Establishing a Unified Basic Old-Age Insurance System for Enterprises Employees, which 
requires all urban workers to participate in a united pension scheme that combines a social pool 
with personal accounts (State Council 1997). Accoridngly, retired workers can draw funds from 
personal accounts based on the amount of their own contributions. In addition, they receive 
money from a social pool account, which is funded by employers' contributions and distributed 
to all retired workers. In the 1994 publication, Views on Reforms of the Medical Care System for 
Enterprise Workers, the government modified the national health policy, setting up a health-care 
insurance scheme that includes a social-pooling fund and personal accounts for SOE workers 
(State Development and Reform Commission et al. 1994). In 1998, the scheme was extended to 
cover all workers (Information Office of the State Council 2002). 
The move from a "rigid, centrally-planned command economy to a multi-ownership 
market economy" (Zhu 2004, 1013) prompted new legislation on labor relations. The 
government also had to manage an increasing number of labor disputes involving the rapidly 
growing number of mostly unregulated private and foreign companies in its coastal provinces 
(Gallagher and Dong 2008). 
In 1994, China enacted the first labor law since its open door policy in the late 1970s. 
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Prior to this, China emphasised self-reliance and self-sufficiency, having few commercial 
contacts with foreign countries. The objectives of the law are to "protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of laborers, readjust labor relationships, establish and safeguard the labor system to suit 
the socialist market economy, and promote economic development and social progress" {Labour 
Law, National People's Congress 1994). It should be noted that the law offers Chinese workers 
rights to equal employment, selection of profession, remuneration, rest, holidays, labor security, 
health protection, job training, and social insurances. The law also introduces a locally based 
minimum wage and an annual vacation leave. Furthermore, it sets additional standards for 
working hours, health, safety, and the protection of women workers. 
In 2007, the Chinese government passed the Labor Contract Law, which took effect on 
January 1, 2008. The law is intended to address domestic and international concerns over abusive 
working conditions, employment insecurity, and deteriorating labor relations (Gallagher and 
Dong 2008). This breakthrough legislation gives trade unions and employee representatives the 
right to negotiate with employers for collective contracts covering a company, industry, or region. 
It also obliges employers to consult with workers when drafting or revising employment 
regulations (BMU Consulting 2008). Moreover, it mandates that all workers must be employed 
on the basis of a written contract that stipulates their wage rates and the conditions under which 
they can be fired. 
The preceding discussion suggests that China's integration with the world economy and 
the collapse of its SOEs forced the Chinese government to provide social security to workers 
through various insurance schemes and to safeguard their rights through labor legislation. For the 
protection of their rights, Chinese workers now rely heavily on the labor-monitoring efforts of 
central and local governments as well as on the judicial system. The next section examines 
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whether China's domestic institutions can protect these rights in the context of rapid economic 
globalization. 
Domestic Constraints and the Rights of Chinese Workers 
The preceding discussion illustrates that China's economic reform has theatened the livelihood of 
hundreds and thousands of SOE workers. Therefore, the Chinese government introduced new 
social insurance schemes and labor legislation to meet workers' welfare needs, improve labor 
relations, and maintain social stability. The effectiveness of these measures is seriously 
constrained, however, by the urban bias in government policies, the restrictions on labor 
activities, a weak judiciary, and local governments' noncompliance with labor regulations. 
The Household Registration System and the Social Exclusion of Migrant Workers 
Despite the promulgation of labor-protection laws and the implementation of several insurance 
schemes, most Chinese migrant workers are unable to access their benefits because of a 
household registration system, Hukou. Before China's economic reform, Hukou provided a 
residency-based welfare entitlement by which the state allocated daily necessities and job 
opportunities, but it also regulated migration. Accordingly, alll Chinese citizens are required to 
apply to the authority to change their place of residence. As the CCP used cheap rural resources 
and agricultural products to help develop China's urban economies, people living in cities had 
better jobs and social services than those in rural areas (Chan and Zhang 1999; Chan 2003). The 
Hukou system institutionalized this disparity, providing relatively poor social services and poor 
job opportunities to residents in rural areas but restricting their ability to relocate. 
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Economic reform released surplus workers from rural areas, and these workers later 
helped to facilitate urban industrialization. In 1978, the government replaced the commune 
system with a household responsibility system. Under China's planned economy, the commune 
system tied a worker to the land in a specific area, and he/she and other workers in the same 
commune were collectively responsible for the production of their common farmland. After the 
elimination of communes, a worker is only working for his/her family's allocated farmland. The 
worker now has little economic relationship with the village and township authorities. Because 
agricultral production from the allocated land is insufficient to support the livelihood of all 
family members, many rurual workers have little choice but move to cities searching for better 
prospects. As a result, the Chinese government made some changes on its Hukou system to 
tackle rural areas' employment pressures. In 1983, peasants were allowed to enter cities and run 
small businesses. Local governments were also granted power from central government to set 
criteria for recruiting peasant workers to meet their areas' economic needs. Given local 
governments' great power over rural migrants, Wu (2009, 38) criticizes that Hukou reform 
became "more of a local government responsibility than a national government based one". 
These policy changes led to a massive labor migration from rural to urban areas, but most 
of these migrants have no residency rights in the cities. Because the Hukou system classifies 
them as peasant-workers, migrants are denied the rights and benefits of permanent urban 
residents and are subject to severe discrimination (Wu 2009). The Hukou and its classifications 
have become an excuse for local authorities to treat migrant workers differently than permanent 
residents. According to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), there were more 
than 120 million rural migrant workers in China in 2006 {People's Daily Online 2006). 
Y\ Zhang and Fang Cai (2008) note that local authorities' welfare programs for migrant 
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workers can be classified into four types: (1) programs that allow migrant workers to join urban 
residents' social insurance schemes; (2) those that provide specific social insurance schemes for 
migrant workers; (3) those that only allow migrant workers to join local rural-migrant insurance 
schemes; and (4) programs that create two types of insurance schemes within single enterprises: 
one for urban residents and another for rural migrants. Because of their residency is officially 
classified as rural, migrant workers are treated as foreign workers; their Chinese citizenship does 
not provide them with welfare entitlements equal to those of permanent residents. 
Although the 1994 Labor Law requires all urban workers to join social insurance 
programs, most migrant workers are excluded from them. As table 1 illustrates, a small 
proportion of migrant workers joined insurance schemes to provide benefits for health (13.8 
percent), old age (10.9 percent), and unemployment insurance (5.3 percent) by 2008 (Zhang and 
Cai 2008). Xiaogang Wu (2009) finds a sizable gap between social insurance coverage for 
workers with permanent urban residency and that for workers with official rural residency; 52.2 
percent of workers with permanent urban residency are reportedly protected by basic pension 
schemes, and 50.4 percent are protected by basic medical insurance schemes. By contrast, only 
7.1 percent of rural migrant workers reportedly have basic pension protection, and only 8.9 
percent have basic medical insurance. Table 2 illustrates these differences. Although the 2007 
Labor Contract Law regards migrant workers as laborers in a legal sense, they still "can be 
treated differently by policies adopted by local governments" (Ngok 2008, 60). 
<Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
The Institutional Suppression of Laid-off Workers and Retired Workers 
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The previous section discussed the disadvantages suffered by rural migrant workers, this section 
will examine the conditions of laid-off and retired workers. It should be stressed that the concept 
of laid-off workers in China is different from that in Western societies. In China, laid-off workers 
from SOEs, as mentioned in the earlier part of this article, would be transferred to 
Re-employment Service Centers for three years. It was only after this three-year period, their 
employment relationship with employers would formally end. The SOEs were required to pay 
work-related insurance schemes' premiums to laid-off workers at the Re-employment Service 
Centers as well as pensions for already retired workers. 
Several factors play a role in the suppression of laid-offer workers' welfare rights. Of 
particular note is employers' failure to pay salary and required insurance premiums for their 
employees. Despite the Chinese government's promises to provide laid-off workers with various 
forms of compensation and to pay their social insurance premiums, many laid-off workers are 
unable to access social insurance benefits because their SOEs have "either gone bankrupt or [are] 
suffering serious losses and [are] deeply in debt" (Solinger 2002, 315). In short, the SOEs lack 
sufficient resources to fulfill their salary and benefit obligations, leaving employees without 
access to benefits (2002). 
According to the ACFTU's 1997 survey, 20 percent of SOE workers, including those who 
were still working and those laid-off workers at the Re-employment Service Centres, 
experienced salary arrears; and 46 percent of workers were due pay for 3 or more months 
(Blecher 2002). Nationally, 24,214 SOEs failed to pay wages and pensions to 3.5 million 
workers for several months in 1996 (Chen 2000). In analysis of a sample of 8,109 respondents 
from five Chinese cities, including Fuzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Xian, William 
Giles, Albert Park, and Fang Cai (2003, 19) find that 11 percent of working-age adults employed 
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from 1996 to 2001 were subject to "wage arrears." In addition, 10 percent of retired respondents 
reportedly experienced "pension arrears," and 30 percent encountered "health expenditure 
reimbursement arrears" (Giles et al. 2003, 51). 
The mentioned problems encoutered by both laid-off and retired workers are actually 
caused by the failure of China's administrative complaints scheme and judicial system in 
protecting the rights of workers. The Chinese government allows citizens to lodge complaints 
against government departments (including SOEs) and officials via letters, e-mails, faxes, 
telephone calls, and personal visits. The State Bureau for Letters and Calls is located in Beijing, 
and local governments have similar offices. Many complainants report, however, that these 
offices do not properly investigate their complaints or even ignore them. 
For example, several hundred workers from the Henan Ya-Xiang Group have registered 
complaints with both central and local offices since 2001, expressing their anger over corruption 
in the company management and irregularities in the handling of its bankruptcy. Despite their 
persistent complaints, they received no response from the authorities {China Labour Bulletin 
2005). A report by the China Labour Bulletin (2007a, 3) asserts that the existing administrative 
complaint system is "over-burdened, unresponsive, overly complex and ineffective." The report 
finds that only three of every 10,000 petitions result in some form of resolution. 
Another difficulty in compelling government departments to investigate complaints is 
that the departments are not accountable to the public. Labor inspectors in particular have 
considerable discretion to dismiss cases that they consider to be inappropriate or outside their 
jurisdiction (Ngok 2008). So too, labor departments, the local bodies charged with overseeing 
business practices and handling labor complaints, lack the authority to impose credible sanctions 
on noncompliant firms. For example, departments lack the authority to force cessation of 
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business, to confiscate firm earnings, or to revoke business licenses. If a local labor department 
finds that an employer violated workers' rights, it can only ask the firm to correct malpractices 
and pay compensations for workers for any losses (Ngok 2008). 
Moreover, local labor departments are subordinate to both the central government's labor 
ministry and to local government leaders. Because local officials have a personal interest in 
economic performance, they "tend to stand up for capital and oppress labor" (Ngok 2008, 55). 
Sean Cooney (2007) notes that China's legal system also sets several barriers in the way 
of workers attempting to defend their rights. Many workers try to defend their rights in the 
judicial system only to find that the courts refuse to deal with their cases. The associate head of 
the Supreme Court of central governmnet argued in 2000 that issues related to 1 aid-off workers 
and pay arrears are special phenomena linked to the central government's policies on enterprise 
reconstruction and labor contracts. He held that the SOE reform guidelines consider such issues 
to be matters of policy and that they must be resolved by local governments rather than by the 
courts {China Labour Bulletin 2008). Local supreme courts accordingly decline to hear labor 
cases linked to the SOE reforms {China Labour Bulletin 2005). The courts are therefore 
obviously unwilling to challenge the legal basis for the government's policies or to check the 
actions of local officials in handling the SEO reforms. 
The primary weakness of China's judicial system is its domination by the executive 
authorities. Local government officials, rather than the central government's Supreme Court, 
decide the budgets of local courts. They allocate funds for basic facilities, set judges' salaries, 
and determine judges' welfare benefits. Local courts are therefore "beholden to the interests of 
local governments" (Michelson 2003, 264). Senior local government officials also sit on 
committees responsible for approving proposals to restructure SOEs in their regions {China 
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Labour Bulletin 2001b). Local judges are therefore understandably unwilling to defend workers' 
rights to the detriment of their own interests. Workers other than those laid off by SOEs also find 
it difficult to seek justice through the courts (Cooney 2007). 
Another barrier is the highly disadvantageous position in which the court process places 
workers. Workers are generally unable to receive legal aid for the expensive legal fees that come 
with bringing actions against abusive businesses. It was reported that offical legal aid centeres 
are not only underfunded but their awyers have little incentive to manage more cases (Taylor 
2011). Also, the average cost for a labour lawsuit in China in 2009 was ¥4,000, which was a 
factory worker's three to four-month wages (Crothall 2009). In sum, these barriers illustrate the 
difficulties faced by Chinese workers attempting to respond to abusive employers. 
Since both the administrative redress scheme and the judicial system fail to protect labor 
rights, workers use protests and demonstrations, even blocking government offices and the 
railways to pressure the authorities to address their concerns. This explains why the number of 
mass protest incidents, including petitions, demonstrations, and other large-scale actions caused 
by labor disputes, jumped from 10,000 in 1993 to 60,000 in 2003; so too, the number of 
participants in these incidents increased from 730,000 to 3,070,000 {China Labour Bulletin 
2008). 
Such labor protests are extremely risky, however, as the central government's top priority 
is social stability. It does not hesitate to use any measure it considers to be effective for 
controlling the spread of protests perceived to be threats to public order {China Labour Bulletin 
2001b, 35). One local police chief emphasized that the government's approach is to "use 
effective methods, grasp the situation and, in particular, discover and control the lead organizers 
and key elements behind the scenes, collecting evidence and being well prepared to handle them 
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according to the law" {China Labour Bulletin 2001b, 35). The authorities suppress peaceful 
protests and arrest labor leaders, charging them with crimes and threatening national security 
{China Labour Bulletin 2001b). Ching Kwan Lee (2005, 30) criticizes the authority for using the 
law as "a tool of control over society, while allowing itself to remain mostly unrestrained by the 
law. When it is not in the interest of the local officials to enforce labour regulations, there is 
hardly enough countervailing authority (from the judiciary, for instance) to preserve the sanctity 
of the law." 
Official Trade Unions and Weak Labor 
The relative power of labor and capital in China is now extremely unbalanced. This is mainly 
because the state-run trade union is relatively weak. Although China's constitution grants 
workers the right to join unions, only the officially funded A C F T U can engage in collective 
bargaining with employers and represent workers in negotiating and signing collective contracts 
(Lee 2005). Furthermore, the A C F T U is managed by government officials instead of workers. 
City- and county-level unions are actually part of the apparatus of the local authorities, and most 
union leaders are CCP cadres (Lee 2005). The A C F T U and its associated unions are therefore 
"mass organizations under the leadership of the Communist Party" and mainly serve the state's 
interests rather than those of the workers (Zhu 2004, 1019; C. Chan 2008). 
Also, many local governments are business partners of foreign joint ventures, and local 
officials are part of the management teams of these firms. When challenged by workers, these 
companies can obtain political support from senior government officials by mobilizing riot 
police to suppress protests or influenicng court decisions. Because local authorities play a dual 
role, acting both as holders of political power and partners in joint-venture enterprises, the ability 
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of official unions to defend workers' rights is obviously restricted. As an electronics company 
worker emphasized when labor disputes led to protests: "The union follows the lead of the 
government" (Gross 2009). 
Since the A C F T U is the sole representative of Chinese workers, those who attempt to 
form independent unions are brutally suppressed, and when workers apply to the authorities to 
set up their own unions, those authorities reject their applications {China Labour Bulletin 2005). 
For example, Wenming L i established the Federation of Migrant Workers and the Association of 
Migrant Workers, which had not been formally approved by the official. As a result, the 
authorities charged L i with engaging in counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement and 
with conspiring to subvert the government. L i was convicted and sentenced to prison for 3 and a 
half years (Chan 2001). 
The introduction of a market economy and the inflow of foreign capital resulted in the 
rapid proliferation of private companies. The state's control over the working class diminished, 
however, because there are few labor unions in the private sector and severe labor disputes arose 
in the absence of government unions. The disputes threatened social stability, as local 
governments found it difficult to contain the public outpourings of long-suppressed anger and 
resentment {China Labour Bulletin 2009). In 2001, the A C F T U announced that it would 
establish a million new unions in private companies and increase the federation's membership by 
36 million workers. This effort was an attempt to consolidate the CCP's power base in the mixed 
economy {China Labour Bulletin 2005). In 2009, the A C F T U established 313 trade unions, and 
unions came to operate in 83 percent of the multinational corporation headquarters in China 
(Gross 2009). 
Despite the increasing number of trade unions, Chinese workers' rights have improved 
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little. In order to achieve its ambitious targets, the A C F T U changed the procedures for forming 
unions. It allows employers to appoint senior managers as the founding chairpersons of their 
companies' unions {China Labour Bulletin 2005). As a result, many of the new unions are 
actually run by the companies' senior managers or even their owners' relatives rather than by 
workers (Chang 2002, 132). Because some unions were established without any election, some 
workers even are not aware that trade unions operate in their factories (C. Chan 2008). Instead of 
promoting labor rights, these unions have become a new mechanism that helps employers to 
regulate workers' activities. 
Anita Chan (2008) argues that some positive developments can be found in the work of 
the ACFTU. Her study of trade unions' relationships with Wal-Mart suggests that the A C F T U 
achieved a breakthrough by setting up union branches in Wal-Mart's stores by "using 
'underground' grassroots tactics' according to which local unions organized workers after 
working hours (Chan 2008, 5). She concludes that "workplace unions organized secretly even by 
official local unions has given space for some workers to grab the opportunity to turn the unions 
in real unions" (2008, 13). In particular, the A C F T U allows workers and union branches to 
negotiate directly with Wal-Mart. 
While recognizing the ACFTU's achievement on the case of Wal-Mart, it should be 
noted that this working model has not been institutionalised by the Chinese government as a 
pratice for establishing similar trade unions in foreign firms. In most cases, the practice for 
forming trade unions in China are still mainly shaped by the attitudes of central and local senior 
government officials. This is because the A C F T U is the sole representative of workers, which is 
still "under the administrative direction of the CCP at the central level, under the direction of the 
local party/state structure at the local level, and under the control of firm management at the firm 
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level" (Gallagher and Dong 2008, 37-38). 
Implementation of the collective bargaining power promised by the Labor Contract Law 
of 2007 requires "significant support from other government branches and the local party," as 
well as the establishment of viable employers' associations to negotiate on the behalf of firms in 
the same industry or region (Gallagher and Dong 2008, 38). Chris Chan (2008, 12) considers the 
future development of China's trade unions and pessimistically concludes that, because unions 
lack active memberships and management generally controls their committees, "the real barrier 
to collective bargaining and democratic trade unionism [remains] unchanged," despite the 2007 
law. 
This section illustrates the role of official unions in China's political control mechanism. 
By allowing employers to control the newly established unions, the CCP shows that it now trusts 
capitalists more than workers. To some extent, the new unions are an expression of an unholy 
alliance between China's communist cadres and global capitalists. This alliance subjects Chinese 
workers to a "hegemony of the market and of the state" (Blecher 2002, 287). 
Policy Implementation and Labor Abuses 
As discussed above, legislation in 1994 and 2007 attempted to safeguard workers' rights in 
China's new market economy, but policy implementation is always problematic in China. In 
particular, low level authorites and local governments may not strictly follow policies set up by 
higher level authorities and central government. Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang L i (1999, 167) 
find "a pattern of selective policy implementation," as bottom-up street-level discretion 
compromised the central government's top-down policies. Susmita Dasgupta, Mainul Huq, and 
David Wheeler (1997, 17) examine the implementation of pollution-control measures, 
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concluding that local government officials frequently bend the rules and that "under-reporting 
and under-assessment of [noncompliance] are common in China." Alasdair MacBean (2007) 
reports similarly that local governments' compliance with China's national environmental 
regulations is poor. The following evidence shows that noncompliance by local governments 
subjects Chinese workers to a wide range of labor abuses: 
Low wages.—Many foreign companies manufacturing goods in China pay their workers 
low wages in order to enhance their profit margins in competitive global markets (Zhu 2004). In 
the city of Shenzhen, for example, a supplier for the global mobile-phone giant Motorola offered 
its workers a basic salary that was lower than the city's minimum wage (Students and Scholars 
Against Corporate Misbehavior [SACOM] 2006). In another case, the authorities caught the 
Ningbo Beifa Group paying its 3,000 employees less than the national minimum wage. Ningbo 
Beifa Group is a top supplier of pens, mechanical pencils, and highlighters to Wal-Mart and other 
major retailers. The authorities caught them doing this on three occasions (Roberts and Engardio 
2006). A 2009 audit finds that 23 of Apple's 83 suppliers paid workers less than the local 
minimum wages and that more than half did not pay their workers the required overtime rates 
{China Economic Review 2010). 
Excessive working hours.—China's Labor Law of 1994 specifies that employees only 
have to work 40 hours a week, are entitled to 1 day off a week, can work a maximum of 3 
overtime hours a day, and should work no more than 36 overtime hours a month (Information 
Office of the State Council 2002). An investigation of five of Wal-Mart's Chinese suppliers led 
SACOM (2007) to report that all severely violated the legal limitations on working hours by 
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requiring their employees to work a minimum of 11 hours a day for 6 days a week, by 
prohibiting employees from refusing overtime, even if they were sick, and by requiring them to 
work more than 160 overtime hours a month (SACOM 2006). 
At the Quan Tak Footwear Company, a Taiwanese-owned supplier for Rocky Brands in 
the United States, employees were required to work from morning until 10 p.m., and sometimes 
even until midnight (Sweatfree Communities 2008). A report by SACOM (2009) finds that the 
Hong Kong-owned Tianyu Toys Factory, which supplies products to Disney, Coca-Cola, Tesco, 
and Tomy, required its workers to work from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. According to a compliance 
manager of a major multinational company, only 20 percent of Chinese suppliers comply with 
wage rules and just 5 percent obey hour limitations (Roberts and Engardio 2006). 
No employment contracts or social security contributions.—Only 40 percent of China's 
firms participated in pension schemes in 2001, because some local authorities allowed employers 
to enroll only 10 to 20 percent of their employees in the legally required social insurance 
schemes (Lee 2005). Of the five Wal-Mart suppliers studied by SACOM (2007), four reportedly 
had no written contracts with young workers and none of them paid the legally required medical 
and pension insurance contributions for their workers. 
Although the 2007 Labor Contract Law requires employers to pay social insurance 
premiums for all workers, SACOM (2009) reports that many workers employed by the Hong 
Kong-owned Tianyu and Wai Shing plastic toy factories had no pension, medical, or 
industrial-injury coverage. Similarly, the authorities found that Kunying Computer Products and 
Xieying Computer Products, suppliers to Microsoft and other global companies, violated labor 
laws by failing to register more than 300 workers between the ages of 16 and 18 and also by 
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forcing them to work excessive amounts of overtime (Barboza 2010). 
Health and safety.—The Hivac Startech Window Film Company, which supplies 
products to Motorola, employs the chemical n-hexane in its manufacturing process. A report by 
SACOM (2006) finds that the company failed to provide employees with a well-ventilated work 
environment and that the factory had n-hexane concentrations of between 449 and 1,106 mg/m , 
well over the maximum safety level of 325 mg/m . Such high concentrations of n-hexane can 
cause serious damage to workers' nervous systems. The report indicates that the company also 
failed to provide the workers with adequate protective equipment and the workers had no way to 
prevent their skin from absorbing n-hexane. Labor-rights groups note that Chinese factory 
workers lose or break more than 40,000 fingers a year on the job {China Economic Review 2010). 
In the Pearl River Delta, factories supplying products to Wal-Mart, Disney, and Dell were 
reportedly employed child labor and failed to pay wages {China Economic Review 2010). 
Poor accommodations.—In China, employers often provide housing for workers. A 2007 
report by SACOM finds unsanitary housing conditions in five factories that supply products to 
Wal-Mart. In one case, a single room reportedly housed 12 male adults, and the communal 
bathrooms were unacceptably dirty. Andrew Malone and Richard Jones (2010) report that 
Foxconn, which supplies iPods and other products to Apple, provided only minimally basic 
accommodations for its 420,000 workers in Shenzhen. The workers reportedly slept in cramped 
rooms on triple-decked bunk beds that had only simple bamboo mats for mattresses. Malone and 
Jones (2010) indicate that some dormitories housed more than 40 people and were infested with 
ants and cockroaches. They also find that these accommodations had no air conditioning, 
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although summertime temperatures there hit 35°C (95°F), and humidity levels rise to 90 percent. 
Humiliating punishments and unreasonable fines.—Intimidation, physical violence, 
corporal punishment, and unreasonable fines are common tactics employed on subsistence-wage 
workers in enterprises backed by foreign investment (Zhu 2004). One factory reportedly fined 
workers ¥10 for not wearing a work cap and ¥50 for anything that the managers perceived to be 
misconduct (SACOM 2007). Foxconn reportedly enforced strict discipline upon its workers and 
docked their salaries for such offenses as having long nails, being late, yawning, eating, sitting 
on the floor, talking, or walking quickly (Maione and Jones 2010). 
Local Government's Self Interest 
The widespread labor abuses in China also needs to be analyzed in the context of local officials' 
self-interest and local governments' financial strains. The central government has absolute power 
over the appointment of senior officials in local governments. Ye Chen, Hongbin L i , and Li-An 
Zhou (2005) conclude that local governments' political status within the national hierarchy and 
the turnover of their top leaders are directly linked to economic performance. This means that 
civil servants' career prospects depend on whether they can achieve the performance targets that 
their administrative superiors set for them. These performance targets are mainly economic, 
including the annual rate of GDP growth, the amount of revenue collected, financial 
contributions to higher levels of government, and the quantity of foreign investment attracted. 
Meeting or exceeding these economic targets is "decisive for local officials seeking political 
promotion" (Liu and Tao 2004, 10). In order to advance their careers, senior officials must make 
economic growth their top priority. They do this by creating favorable business conditions and 
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avoiding the active defense of labor rights. 
The effects of these pressures can be seen in Shanghai, where foreign employers often 
fail to contribute legally required premiums for old age, health and unemployment insurances. 
One study finds this failure among 82 percent of companies owned by interests from Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan, among 76 percent of those owned by European and American interests, and 
among 83 percent of those owned by other foreigners (Maitra et al. 2005). As local governments 
compete with each other for foreign investments (Li et al. 2011), senior officials are unlikely to 
implement or enforce strict labor-protection measures for fear of driving foreign firms elsewhere. 
Reducing workers' welfare "in the pursuit of economic development is an unspoken policy 
approach of many local authorities" (translated by authors) (Pan 2002, 162). 
The pursuit of foreign investment is also a result of the financial pressures on local 
governments. According to the World Bank (2002), 70 percent of China's public expenditure 
occurs at the subnational level (i.e., provinces, prefectures, counties, and townships). The 
introduction of the 1994 tax-sharing reform increased the central government's revenues but 
weakened the local governments' fiscal ability to fulfill their welfare responsibilities (Wong 2000; 
Jin 2005; Zhang 2006). Local governments now provide social services that were once the 
responsibility of the SOEs before China's economic reform. Estimates from the Ministry of 
Finance (2008) indicate that local governments received only 47 percent of China's public 
income in 2006 but bore 75 percent of its national expenditures (Ministry of Finance 2008). One 
study indicates that nearly 90 percent of the 2,000 townships in Hunan Province were in debt in 
2001 (Liu and Tao 2004). In fact, county and village authorities' total estimated debt amounted 
to ¥17.7 billion in 2002; the estimated average debt was ¥4 million for township governments 
and ¥20,000 for village governments (Ministry of Finance 2008). 
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Since the 1994 tax reform, which was originally stated in the Decision of the CCP 
Central Committee on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic 
Structure (CCP Central Committee 1993), local authorities have relied heavily on taxes from 
commercial activities and the sale of land. These income sources include business taxes, income 
taxes and profit remittances from local government-owned enterprises, urban land-use taxes, and 
income taxes from commercial enterprises other than those controlled by the central government 
(Wong 2000; Jin et al. 2005). Dependence on these sources and such financial considerations 
make local officials notably passive in the enforcement of labor laws (C. Chan 2008), as the need 
to increase the tax base provides them with an incentive to pursue pro-business policies (Jin et al. 
2005). For example, they do not actively prosecute firms classified as major polluters because 
such firms are "important to the local economy in terms of providing tax revenue or 
employment" (OECD 2006, 35). 
Because of conflicting interests, policies of China's central government are not fully 
implemented, and "offsetting policies issued by local governments" undermine national policy 
efforts (Wu et al. 2007, 580). Local officials only engage in activities that the central government 
effectively monitors and make no effort to implement policies that it does not monitor (Huang 
1995). Local officials can always find ways to "evade central regulations when they conflict with 
local vested interests" (Liu and Tao 2004, 2). Plans for affordable housing projects, for example, 
were unsuccessful because they could not benefit local governments (Li, Chiang, and Choy 
2011). Local impediments to effective implementation of national labor laws, particularly local 
officials' career ambitions and foreign firms' local tax contributions, are key phenomena that 
explain why China cannot stop labor abuses despite the high legal standards it established for 
labor protection. 
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Unchecked local administrations, a weak judicial system, and a powerless working class 
result in large-scale violations of labor rights in modern China. Prior to the promulgation of the 
2007 Labor Contract Law, Mary Gallagher and Baohua Dong (2008) predicted that the measure's 
implementation would be unsuccessful because the government does not match such legal 
changes with political reforms. In the absence of a democratic system for checking the activities 
of local governments and an independent judicial system for defending the rights of workers, the 
new labor law could only offer false promises to the suffering Chinese workers. 
Conclusion 
Some argue that a nation's domestic institutions can shape the effect of globalization. To evaluate 
that argument, this article examines the experiences of Chinese workers, finding that China's 
internal factors exacerbate the negative effects of global capital's exploitation of labor. The case 
of China provides several insights into globalization's interactions with domestic institutions. 
The first of these insights is that good labor legislation is impotent if it is not 
implemented effectively. It is evident that local government officials, principally motivated to 
boost their local economies by attracting foreign investment, have molded China's labor 
regulations to their own ends. As a result, there is lax enforcement of fine-sounding labor 
legislation and little improvement in working conditions, despite the high standards that 
legislation sets for labor protection. 
A second insight is that the successful implementation of labor legislation depends on the 
presence of an independent national judicial system. This article shows that Chinese workers 
have little hope in defending their rights through a judiciary effectively controlled by local 
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government officials who are reluctant to prosecute abusive employers for fear of losing foreign 
investments. China's local governments' passive role in defending worker rights show that 
national policies can be subverted and nullified if regional interests conflict with national 
policies. Particularly, local officials and foreign businessmen align against national efforts on 
providing a decent work environment for workers in a competitive global economy. 
Another insight is that the balance of power between capital and labor is likely to be 
extremely unequal if trade unions are not independent. As this article indicates, Chinese workers 
have no freedom to establish trade unions or to take industrial actions. They can only be 
represented by the ACFTU, which discourages protests and has political stability, rather than 
labor rights, as its principal concern. 
A final insight pertains to codes of conduct. The widespread labor-rights violations 
committed by Chinese suppliers of global companies directly call into question the effectiveness 
of the existing multinational corporations' codes of conduct. According to Niklas Egels-Zanden 
(2007, 45), "Chinese suppliers successfully deceive toy retailers' monitoring organizations by 
decoupling the formal monitored part of their organisation from the actual operational part of 
their organisation." More effective monitoring procedures must be established to safeguard the 
well-being of workers in China and other developing countries. 
China's experience illustrates the ways in which forces of globalization have been 
shaped by the suppression of rural migrant workers' citizenship rights, by local governments' 
noncompliance with central policies and law, by the absence of an independent judicial system, 
and by the absence of independent trade unions. While facing a relatively weak labour force in 
such an environment, multinational firms can maxmize business interests by offereing workers 
low wages and poor work conditions. According to Mehmet and colleagues (1999, 19), the 
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capital-labor asymmetry results in a global assembly line with "exploitative and coercive 
production systems." It is evident that Asian, European, and other already industrialized 
economies endeavor to squeeze their labor costs by requiring Chinese workers to work for low 
wages in poor and dangerous work environments. As a result of rapid economic growth and 
integration into the global economy, China has become the world's biggest sweatshop. 
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Table 1 
Insurance Programmed Participation Rates among Migrant Workers 






















Source—Zhang and Cai 2008, 186-89. 
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Table 2 
Welfare Differences between Permanent Urban Workers and Rural Migrant Workers in 2005 
Publicly-fonded Medicare* 
Basic medical insurance 
Supplementary medical insurance 
Basic pension 
Supplementary pension plan 
Unemployment insurance 





















*Medicare in here refers to public-funded health care scheme in China. 
Source —Wu 2009, 46. 
1
 Before introducing economic reform in the late 1970s, China was a planned economy, and all economic entities 
were owned and managed by the government. Based on socialist ideologies, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
provided comprehensive social services for meeting workers all types of needs, including health, education, housing, 
childcare, burial services, and financial assistance. Thus, a SOE was like "a mini-welfare state" (Leung and Nann 
1995, 57). Although the Chinese government sold many SEOs to private companies, especially the small and 
medium-sized ones, it still controls a significant number of SEOs with economic and military importance such as 
China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, and China National 
Machinery Industry Corporation. As China's WTO membership will not allow it to heavily subsidize the SOEs, the 
Chinese government introduced a large scale enterprise reform since the early 1990s in an attempt to enhance the 
productivity of public-funded enterprises. China expects its SOEs can compete effectively with foreign firms for the 
local market. 
2
 The central government of China publishes policy papers called 'decisions' to address social, political and 
economic issues. These 'decisions', however, are not law but administrative rules and regulations only. Very often, 
'decisions' provide government departments with key ideologies and guiding principles for drafting new laws. 
3
 As mentioned in note 2, prior to China's economic reform, SOEs provided workers with comprehensive social 
services. Workers from SOEs, however, did not need to pay insurance contributions because of low wages, and their 
enterprises were required to pay 3% of the total wages as insurance premiums. During the time of a planned 
economy, Chinese government was responsible for any losses incurred by the SOEs. However, both central and local 
governments found it difficult to bear this financial burden as many SOEs suffered heavy losses and were unable to 
pay workers' insurance premiums, nor meet employees' welfare needs. In order to shift the welfare duties from the 
state to the SOEs and their employees, China's central government introduced various types of insurance schemes 
that require contributions from both SOEs and their employees. For example, an unemployment scheme for the 
workers of SOEs was implemented in 1986, an old age pension scheme in 1991, and a medical scheme in 1994 
(Chan, Ngok, and Phillips 2008). The three security systems mentioned in this article were established after China's 
economic reform with an aim of addressing workers' social service needs in a mixed economy. The basic living 
guarantee system was only for laid-off workers from SOEs, who entered the Re-employment Service Centers and 
still maintained an employment relationship with their employers. The unemployment insurance is for workers who 
have paid unemployment insurance premium. The minimum living standard guarantee is for poor citizens whose 
incomes are below a certain level. 
